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ABSTRACT
Over the period of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s Mexico experienced
a significant increase in wage inequality. The literature has typically at-
tributed this rise in inequality to trade liberalization and foreign direct in-
vestment. We argue, however, that a better explanation can be found in
the changing labor market institutions such as declining union power and
the declining real value of the minimum wage. We oﬀer evidence to suggest
that these domestic institutional changes have indeed contributed to grow-
ing wage inequality, and show that the timing of these institutional changes
better matches the trajectory of wage inequality in Mexico than does the
timing of reforms.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we explain the rise and then the decline in the wage inequal-
ity in Mexico over the last two decades from the standpoint of the labour
market institutions. We put forward a hypothesis, and evidence in support
of it, that it is the changes in the domestic labour market institutions, es-
pecially declining minimum wages and the declining unionization, that had
a significant impact on the wage inequality.
Wage inequality in Mexico increased significantly during the 1980s and
the early 1990s. Standard deviation of log wages, often used as a measure
of inequality, increased by about 10% over the period 1984 to 1996; over
the same period the Gini coeﬃcient for log wages increased by about 24%.
Inequality however started to decline in the mid 1990s. By year 2000, the
standard deviation of log wages, compared to 1996, had declined by about
7% and the Gini coeﬃcient had declined by 21%.1
Over the same period there were major changes in trade policy in Mex-
ico. Following the debt crisis of 1982 protection of the domestic industries
through import substitution policies was phased out and replaced by liber-
alization of both trade and foreign ownership of capital.2 Standard trade
theories suggest that as a country like Mexico, which is abundant in un-
skilled labour, opens itself to trade the relative returns to the unskilled
workers should increase, lowering the wage inequality in the economy. In-
stead we observe a rise in the relative returns to the skilled workers leading
to increased wage inequality.
Two reason, in particular, have been put forward to explain the appar-
ent contradiction between theory and empirical findings. First, prior to
the trade reforms being initiated, the import substitution policies in place
1Source: Author’s calculations from Encuesta National de Ingresos y Gastos de los
Hogares (ENIGH) data.
2For details on the opening up of the Mexican economy over the last two decades refer
to Lustig (1998 and 2001), and Ten Kate (1992).
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protected sectors with low skilled workers. As the economy opened rents
accruing to these workers stopped, causing an increase in wage gap between
the skilled and the unskilled workers (Revenga, 1997; Hanson and Harrison,
1999). Another link between trade reforms and rising wage inequality is
through outsourcing. According to Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Han-
son (1997, 2003) increase in foreign direct investment increased outsourcing
to Mexico, mainly from the US. Most of the activities that relocated were
low-skill intensive for the US, but medium to high-skill intensive for Mexico.
As a result the relative demand for skilled workers increased in Mexico, rais-
ing the skill premium and widening the wage gap between the skilled and
the unskilled workers (Cragg and Epelbaum, 1996).
There are, however, limitations to these arguments, both in their method-
ology and analysis. First, most of these studies cover the period of late 1980s
or the early 1990s. This period is too short to fully analyze the impact of
trade reforms. For instance looking at the period till early 1990s would fail
to capture impact of NAFTA which was signed in 1994. Second, most of the
studies mentioned above use macro-survey data of manufacturing plants, or
the micro level data for limited number of urban areas.3 To what extent
the wage trends observed in the manufacturing sector or the urban sector
alone can be generalized for the entire workforce remains doubtful.
Thirdly, there are other studies that point towards diﬀerent reasons for
the rising wage inequality in Mexico. Behram, Birdsall and Szekely (2000)
and Airola and Juhn (2005), argue that trade liberalization per se did not
widen the wage diﬀerentials in the region.4 It is the other structural reforms
— domestic financial market reforms, capital account liberalization and tax
reforms — that had a dis-equalizing eﬀect, that too only in the short run.
Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez (2003), in their study on Mexico, find that
3Hanson (2003) in the only exception, he uses the 1% random sample from 1990 and
2000 census data.
4Airola et al (2005) focus only on Mexico; Behram et al (2000) look at 18 Latin Amer-
ican countries.
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for the period 1988 to 1994 trade liberalization would have lead to a de-
crease in wage inequality as suggested by standard trade theories, but for
the technological progress that accompanied it, which lead to a negative
impact on inequality. For the period 1994 to 2000 they find no impact of
trade liberalization on wage diﬀerentials.
The most serious limitation of these studies is that the timing of trade
reforms, as well as other structural reforms, and the trends in inequality
do not match. It is this issue that we address directly. We argue that
the timing of the changes in the minimum wages and unionization match
up much better with trajectory of inequality, than do the impact of any
reforms undertaken in the economy. Prior to Mexico’s dramatic reductions
in barriers to trade and foreign investment, the country embarked on a
strategy of freeing the labor market from institutional ‘rigidities’ such as
labor union power and minimum wages. Union density declined from 22.7%
in 1984 to 14.8% in 1996, and over the same period the real value of the
minimum wage decreased by about 50%.5 Unions and minimum wages were
on the decline precisely when inequality was rising, and when these stopped
declining, so too did inequality stop rising.
One paper that discusses the issue of timing of the trade reforms, though
not explicitly, is Verhoogen (2004). According to him, as the trade liberal-
ization takes place and domestic producers face competition in the export
markets, they upgrade the quality of their products. This quality upgrading
requires better “technical know-how or entrepreneurial ability” (Verhoogen,
2004), which in turn leads to higher relative wages for the white-collar work-
ers, and hence a higher within-industry inequality. However, this quality
upgrading (or the restructuring of the production structure) took place only
between 1993 and 1997, which is not the period of high inequality.
5Source for union density figures - author’s calculations from the ENIGH data. Source
for minimum wage statistics - Annual Report, Banco de Mexico, 1996.
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2 Wage Inequality and Structural Reforms
In this section, we begin by outlining the trajectory of wage inequality and
the structural reforms in Mexico. We then analyze the changes in the
distribution of wages and the returns to education in the context of the
periodization done on the basis of reforms and inequality.
2.1 Trajectory of Wage Inequality
We use seven years of data, from Encuesta National de Ingresos y Gastos
de los Hogares (ENIGH), spread over the period 1984 to 2000. These are
the national household surveys that began in 1984 and continued in 1989,
1992, and every two years thereafter. The survey employs a ‘stratified
sampling’ technique, so we use sample weights made available by ENIGH in
the analysis below.
The sample utilized here is only of working men from the surveyed house-
holds. Men form about 65% of the labour force in Mexico. To avoid the
issue of diﬀerences across gender in wages we look only at men. The earn-
ings variable is the hourly real wage and it is computed from the reported
earnings during the month before the survey and reported hours of work
last week.6 Use of wages is more appropriate in this analysis since they
are more closely related to the market prices for skills. In the estimate of
the wage no fringe benefits, tips, bonuses or commissions are included. To
ensure an accurate measure of the wage, all those who are self-employed or
working without pay are deleted from the sample. We also exclude from
the analysis all those who hold more than one job.
Table 1 reports the measures of dispersion of log wages over the period
1984 to 2000. Wage inequality, as measured by standard deviation of log
wages, Gini coeﬃcient, and wage diﬀerential between the 90th and the 10th
6To obtain real wages, nominal wages are deflated by the National Consumer Price
Index (NCPI), which is found in the Annual Report, 1996 and 2000, published by Banco
de Mexico.
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percentile increased until the mid 1990s, after which it experienced a decline.
While the 90-50 wage diﬀerential follows the overall trend of increasing till
the mid 1990s and decreasing after that, the 50-10 wage diﬀerential follows
the opposite trend of decreasing till the mid 1990s and increasing there-
after; indicating that the changes in the upper half of the wage distribution
dominate the overall trends in wage inequality.
In Figure 1, we plot the change in log wages by percentiles over the
period 1984-2000. We split the period into two, 1984-1996 (the period
of rising inequality)7, and 1996-2000 (the period of decreasing inequality).
For the period of rising inequality both the 10th and the 90th percentile
wages declined, by 16% and 13% respectively. Over the next few years
(1996 to 2000) both percentiles saw an uneven increase in their wages, with
the top gaining 22% and the bottom only 3%. The decline in wages has
been more in the middle of the distribution, where for the entire period the
median worker lost 16% and the workers at the 30th and the 40th percentile
saw their wages erode by almost 25%.8 This decline of the middle could
explain the trend in the 50-10 wage diﬀerential pointed out above.
2.2 Trajectory of Structural Reforms
Of all the policy changes introduced in Mexico since the early 1980s, the
most discussed and analyzed are the trade reforms, which started with the
signing of GATT in 1986 and were pushed further by signing of NAFTA in
1994. Along with the trade reforms, were also initiated a number of other
reforms — domestic financial market reforms, capital account liberalization,
tax reforms, privatization of state owned enterprises, and labour reforms.
7Inequality started to decline in the mid 1990s, so where should we choose to split the
data — 1994 or 1996? In 1994 Mexico had a currency crisis, therefore, by taking the cut
oﬀ point at 1996 we make sure that second period is not only one of declining inequality
but also of relative stability.
8This finding is unlike the finding for the US, where the log wage change is a (positively
sloped) linear function of the percentile (Juhn et al, 1993).
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To get an idea of how the reforms progressed over this period we plot
the diﬀerent reform indices calculated by Lora (1997, 2001), in Figure 2.
All these indices are relative to the reform process in the 19 Latin American
countries considered by Lora. The indices are normalized between 0 and
1, where 0 is the minimum value and 1 is the maximum value observed
among all the Latin American countries during the period of study, 1985
to 2000. Five reform areas are considered: (i) trade policy, (ii) financial
policy, (iii) tax policy, (iv) privatization, and (v) labour legislation. The
structural reform index is a simple average of all the five reform indices.
The index for capital account liberalization is obtained from the study by
Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999), which is similar to the study done
by Lora, with the period of analysis being 1970 to 1995.
The structural reform index, indication of overall reform process, in-
creased from 0.29 in 1985 to 0.51 in 1999, but most of the increase hap-
pened pre-1994, after which the index actually starts to fall. Two reform
areas that saw little to no change in Mexico are, the tax policy and labour
legislation. The financial reform index increases slowly till 1993, followed
by a large jump in 1994, indicating a major change in policy. Privatization
index reflects cumulative privatization as a proportion of the GDP for each
year. For Mexico privatization has been taking place at a steady pace with
noticeable jumps in the index in 1990, the year of sale of TELMEX, and
1994/95. Two areas of reform that saw significant progress are trade policy
and capital account liberalization.
The trade reform index is average of two components — average levels of
tariﬀs and dispersion of tariﬀs. Two cautions while interpreting this index,
first, as with all the other indices it tells us when the government policies
were implemented, not when the impact of these reforms was felt. Second,
if protection to begin with was very high, as was the case in Mexico, then
lower tariﬀs will not necessarily lead to higher imports. Both caveats are
8
noted by the authors’ of the reform indices.
In Figure 3 we put the trade reform index with the figures for imports
and real exchange rate. The trade reform index increased till 1989, between
June 1985 and June 1988 the percentage of domestic production covered by
import licences fell from 92.2 percent to 23.2 percent (see Appendix A,
Table A1). After 1989 the trade reform index became stable, declining in
the post 1996 period. Over the period of rising index value, we see Peso
depreciating. The depreciating exchange rate implies that the decrease in
import protection did not translate into higher imports.9 In fact we do not
see any discernible jumps in the import’s series, which continue to increase
at a steady rate right till 1999.10 The imports seem more in tandem with
the changes in the real exchange rate, Peso appreciated from 1987 to 1993,
which by itself can be an incentive to increase imports, irrespective of the
trade reforms.
Coming to the capital account liberalization index — one outcome of the
capital account reforms would be an increase in FDI. While the Mexican
government had been trying to attract foreign capital since the debt crisis
of 1982, the actual regulations on foreign ownership changed only very late
in the decade. In May 1989 new regulations governing foreign investment
were put in place, bit its only in 1993, when the new Foreign Investment Law
formally replaced the 1973 law that governed the foreign direct investment
in the country (Panuco-Laguette and Szekely, 1996; Dornbusch and Werner,
1994). While the reform index has been increasing steadily from 1985 to
1995, the FDI started increasing only after 1990, with the biggest jump
coming between 1993 and 1994.
In Table 2 we present a correlation matrix between the diﬀerent reform
indices and the measures of wage inequality. Structural reform index is
9Ten Kate (1992) argues that the trade reforms did not begin to impact the economy
until after 1988.
10With the exception of 1994-95,the period of currency crisis, when both the real ex-
change rate and imports fell.
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positively correlated with inequality, more reforms means higher inequality.
Looking at the components of the general structural reform index, we find
opposing forces. While trade reforms and labour legislations have a negative
relationship with the inequality, privatization and financial reforms have a
positive relationship. Capital account liberalization has a very high and
positive impact on inequality.
Given the pattern of structural reforms and the trajectory of wage in-
equality outlined above we can consider the period 1984 to 1996 as one of
not only rising inequality, but also one of major reforms. After 1996 the
country has seen a decline in inequality and increased relative stability.
2.3 Do the trajectories match?
Now that we have both the trajectory of wage inequality and reform process
we address the question: do the trajectories match? We focus the rest
of our analysis on trade reforms and capital account liberalization. These
were the two most important reforms for Mexico; based on evidence from
Table 2 they both had opposing eﬀect on wage inequality; further the timing
of these two reforms is diﬀerent. While most of the policies for the trade
reforms were introduced in the period 1984 to 1989, the policies liberalizing
the capital account were introduced in the period 1989 to 1996.
We split our sample into tradable and nontradable sectors of the econ-
omy. It is in the tradable sector that we would expect trade reforms to
have their greatest impact; this is also the sector which received about
49% of the foreign direct investment.11 The nontradable sector includes
agriculture, mineral and fuel extraction, electricity and water, construction,
wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication, and service indus-
tries. Many of these sectors are involved in activities that are not traded,
but may be open to foreign investment. Whole sale and retail trade and
11Source for FDI figures: Secretar´ıa de Economı´a. Direccio´n General de Inversio´n Ex-
tranjera. The figures are averages over 1994 to 2004.
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the service industries together received another 43% of FDI. So we split our
nontradable sector into two groups - one which received FDI and another
which was more or less closed to both trade and FDI.12
Tradable sector consistently forms around 22 to 24 % of the sample over
the entire period. The employment shares within the nontradable sector
have however changed, while the industries receiving FDI have increased
their share of employment from 38.5% in 1984 to 42.2% in 2000, the share
of industries not receiving FDI has decreased by an equal amount (see Table
3). The closed sector of the economy (i.e. the nontradable, no FDI sector)
has the lowest mean wage, lowest average years of schooling,13 and the lowest
unionization rates over the entire period compared to the other two sectors
of the economy. This is also the sector that saw little to no change in
its inequality till 1996, and had a decrease in inequality of 3.7% after that.
Over the entire period, from 1984 to 2000, both sectors that received FDI —
tradable and part of nontradable — saw an increase in inequality, 12.8% and
19.3% respectively, most of this increase came before 1996.
Most of the trade reforms took place between 1984 and 1989; the in-
equality over this period increased, more in the tradable sector than the
non-tradable sector. To isolate any eﬀect that FDI (or lack of it) might
have on wage dispersion, we compare the tradable sector with the non-
tradable sector receiving FDI, the inequality increased more in the later.
Most of the policies directed towards attracting FDI changed from 1989 to
1996; over this period while the closed sector of the economy saw a decrease
in inequality the sector receiving FDI (both tradable and non-tradable) saw
an increase in inequality.
Next we estimate returns to diﬀerent levels of education to further ex-
12Feliciano (2001) also looks at the tradable and the nontradable sector as defined by
us, however her analysis does not take into account the FDI going to the nontradable
sector.
13Hence lowest levels of skills, if we assume years of schooling to reflect the skill level.
For details on how years of schooling are calculated refer to Appendix A, Table A2
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plore the hypothesis that it is the rising rates of return to higher educa-
tion, due to an increased demand for skilled labor, that accounts for rising
wage dispersion. To capture the returns to education we run a weighted
least squares log wage regression, where the dependent variable is the log
of hourly wages and the explanatory variables are: age, age-squared, union
status, nine education dummies, three regional dummies, fifteen occupation
dummies, and two industry dummies. The industry dummies capture the
three diﬀerent sectors of interest - tradable sector, nontradable-FDI sector
and nontradable-no FDI sector. We also include interactive terms of in-
dustry dummies with the education dummies to allow the rate of return
to education to depend on the sector each individual is working in. The
definitions of diﬀerent educational, regional, and occupational categories are
reported in Appendix A, Table A2.
Regression results are reported in Table 4. Before turning to the returns
to education, we make a few general observations from the regression results.
Returns to age (labor market experience) decreased over time, reflected by
the declining magnitude of the coeﬃcient on age. The regional dummies
are significant and show a distinct pattern, the gap between the north of the
country and the other regions has increased over time.14
If over the period 1984 to 1996 the reforms were increasing the inequality
in the society by increasing the returns to skilled workers, then we should see
the returns to workers in the closed sector and the tradable sector diverging,
at least for the high skilled workers, and the gap between the returns to
higher and lower education should increase. Instead what we observe is:
(1) There are no significant diﬀerences between the returns to education
for workers in the closed sector and in the tradable sector of the economy,
at given level of education, in any year.
14This is consistent with the findings of Hanson (1997), where the author shows that
the trade reforms in Mexico have benefited the north of the country disproportnately, at
the cost of the other regions in the country.
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(2) Comparing the workers in the closed sector and the nontradable
sector open to FDI, once again there is no significant diﬀerence in the returns
to education either in 1984 or 2000. There is a diﬀerence in 1989 and 1996
with returns to education being lower for the nontradable sector with FDI.
(3) Between 1984 and 1996 it’s only the non-tradable sector, open to
FDI that saw an increase in the gap between the returns to higher and
lower education, while the gap actually decreased for the other two sectors.
The increased gap is not a result of an increase in the returns to higher
education, but is due to a decrease in the returns to lower education.
From the above analysis we can discern that the reform process cannot
satisfactorily account for the changes in inequality in the period 1984-1996.
Over half of the overall rise (i.e. 0.039/0.072) in wage dispersion happened
in period 1984 to 1989, a period when trade reforms were implemented, but
cannot account for this rise. In the latter period, dominated by increased
flows of FDI, we do find inequality rising in sectors receiving these FDI’s,
but the mechanism is not clear. We find little evidence of returns to edu-
cation changing, precisely when, according to the rising demand for skilled
labor hypothesis related to trade reforms and FDI, we should see significant
movements in returns to skills.
So what explains the rising inequality? We turn to this in the next
section.
3 Changing Labor Market Institutions
It is now widely accepted that labor market institutions — trade unions
and minimum wages in particular — may account for a significant share
of the growing wage inequality in the US. A series of recent articles has
established the eﬀect that trade unions (Fairris, 2003) and minimum wage
policies (Cortez, 2001; Fairris et al, 2005) have on wage dispersion in Mexico.
Unions decrease wage dispersion by leveling the pay structure within
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firms by bargaining a larger wage increase for low-skill workers than for high-
skill workers; and by fostering equal pay for equal work across industries and
regions.
The minimum wage floor does not directly aﬀect many workers in Mex-
ico; informal sector workers earn wages below the floor, and formal sector
workers generally earn more than the floor. The role of minimum wage
in Mexico goes beyond that of setting a lower bound on the wages in the
formal sector of the economy. Minimum wages serve as a norm for wage
setting more generally throughout the Mexican economy. There is anecdo-
tal and empirical evidence to suggest that wages in the mid-to-lower tail of
the wage distribution across occupations are commonly set at multiples of
the minimum wage (Fairris et al, 2005; Maloney and Nunez, 2001). The
stabilization programs followed in the country in the late 1980s, to quell the
inflationary pressures, further strengthened the links between wage levels,
wage changes and the minimum wage.
An important channel through which minimum wages influence wages
is unions. Changes agreed to in the minimum wage agreements become
the benchmark, if not the rule, for collective bargaining outcomes in the
union sector. Wages of the union and the formal sector workers then can be
expected to follow more closely the changes in the minimum wage. Findings
of Fairris et al (2005) suggests that, in fact, wage changes in both the union
and the non-union sector are linked with the changes in the minimum wage.
What are the trajectories of union density and the value of the minimum
wage over the period of concern to us in this paper? From 1984 to 1996 the
real value of the minimum wage in Mexico declined by about 54% (declining
by about 30% between 1985 and 1989; 35% between 1989 and 1996) and
only about 2% after that till 1999 (Appendix A, Table A1). This decline
in minimum wage aﬀects the wages throughout the economy. Especially it
holds down the wages in the mid-to-lower tail of the distribution, allowing
14
the wages in the upper tail to increase with inflation, leading to a widening
gap and inequality. This could also explain the decreasing returns and the
decreasing average wages for the low skilled workers.
Over the period of rising wage inequality (1984 to 1996) we see a decline
in the unionization rates in Mexico, as shown in Table 5. Over this period
unionization declined by almost 8 percentage points, with most of the de-
cline happening after 1989. The unionization rates for the manufacturing
industries (tradable sector) went down from 30% in 1984 to 19% in 1996,
compared to the 20% and 13% respectively for the non-tradable sector as
a whole. Although the decline in union density was the biggest for the
tradable sector it remained the most unionized sector of the economy right
till 2000.15
The inequality in wages of the union workers increased by 31%, compared
to 7% for the nonunion workers, from 1984 to 1996. Although inequality in
the union sector is rising faster than that in the nonunion sector, the actual
level of inequality for the nonunion workers is higher, as hypothesized. So
what we have is an increase in nonunion workers, for whom the inequality in
wages is higher, and the workers that remain in the union sector are seeing
a rapid increase in their wage inequality due to declining bargaining power.
3.1 Accounting for Inequality
To get some idea about how much the diﬀerent factors contribute to inequal-
ity we do a simple decomposition, proposed by Gary Fields (2003). Consider
the wage regression,
logwit =
J+2X
j=1
ajtZjit, (1)
15For detailed analysis of changing union density in Mexico refer to Fairris and Levine
(2004).
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where at = [αt β1t β2t ... βJt 1] and Z
0
it = [1 X1it X2it ... XJit εit].
wit is the wage of the i
th individual in the tth time period, at is a vector of
coeﬃcients, Zit is a vector of explanatory variables (including the residual
term). For the wage regression of the form given in equation (1) and using
the variance of log wages as a measure of inequality, Fields shows that the
share of the variance of log wages that is attributable to the jth explanatory
variable can be written as:
sj =
ajσ(Zj)Cor.(Zj , logw)
σ(logw)
, (2)
such that
J+2P
j=1
sj = 100%, and
J+1P
j=1
sj = R
2 of the regression in (1). sj is called
the ‘relative factor inequality weight’. σ(.) is the standard deviation of
the variable, and Cor.(Zj , logw) is the correlation between the explanatory
variables and log wages.
For explanatory variables that enter the wage regression in a simple way
(for example the dummy for union) interpretation of sj is straightforward.
For categorical variables (like education) and variables that enter the wage
regression in a nonlinear way (age and age square), we define a generic factor,
say ‘education’ and ‘experience’. sj ’s for the entire set of education dummies
are then summed together to get the overall importance of ‘education’; for
‘experience’ we sum the weights for age and age squared. Treatment of
interactive terms however is diﬃcult, one cannot classify them in any single
‘generic’ factor.
The change in inequality over time can be written as:
σ2(logw2)− σ2(logw1) =
X
j
£
sj2σ2(logw2)− sj1σ2(logw1)
¤
, (3)
where 1 and 2 represent two time periods. The contribution of the jth factor
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to the change in inequality can be written as:
πj =
s2σ2(logw2)− sj1σ2(logw1)
σ2(logw2)− σ2(logw1)
, (4)
such that
P
j
πj = 100%.
Focusing only at the period of rising inequality, we calculate the share
of each factor in explaining the level of inequality in any given year and
how the factor contributed to the change in inequality over time. Results
are reported in Table 6. For all three years, after residuals the two most
important variables accounting for inequality are education and occupation.
Variable of interest, unions, accounts for 3.7% of the inequality in 1984, with
it’s share declining to only 1.6% by 1996.
As expected ‘education’ has a significant role in explaining the changes
in inequality.16 For the period 1984 to 1989, 64.8% of the increase in in-
equality can be attributed to changes in education, this declined to 60.8%
for the period 1989 to 1996.17 While it has been known in the litera-
ture that changing returns to education are important in explaining the rise
in inequality in Mexico, the exact magnitude of the contribution was not
known.
For the first sub period (1984 to 1989) unions have an equalizing impact,
of the magnitude of 32.2%. For the period when union density declined
the most (1989 to 1996) unions contributed 18.2% to the rise in inequality.
Although unions have a small share in explaining the level of inequality in
any given year, they do account in a big way for the changes in inequality.
We have classified workers into three broad industrial categories. To-
16This will capture both the changes in the returns to education and the changes in the
composition of diﬀerent education groups.
17The contribution of each factor to the change in inequality can be further broken down
into price eﬀect and quantity eﬀect. With price eﬀect capturing the changes in returns to
diﬀerent explanatory variables and the quantity eﬀect capturing the changes in the levels
of the explanatory variables. For all the explanatory variables considered here, almost all
their contribution comes from the price eﬀect. Detailed results are not presented here,
but are available from the author.
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gether ‘industry’ accounts for 13.5% of the change in inequality over the
period 1984 to 1989, and has an equalizing eﬀect for the 1989 to 1996 pe-
riod. Taking a closer look at the components of the generic factor ‘industry’
for the period 1984 to 1989, it’s the changes in the nontradable sector with
FDI that contributed to the rise in inequality (22%); the changes in tradable
sector actually had an equalizing eﬀect (-8.3%).
4 Conclusion
In this paper we took a close look at the changing inequality in Mexico
over the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s. Our findings suggest that
over diﬀerent periods diﬀerent factors were at play. For the period of 1984
to 1989, contrary to the arguments in the literature trade reforms did not
have much impact. Its the declining value of the real minimum wages
which explains the rise in inequality, it could have lead to the widening
gap between the skilled and the unskilled workers, as a result ‘education’
stands out as the biggest contributor to the rise in inequality. For 1989
to 1996 the changes are explained by increased flow of FDI (which in turn
are attributed to capital account liberalization) and the continued changes
in the labor market institutions, with unions explaining about 18% of the
increase in inequality.
Part of the explanation for the declining wage inequality since the mid
1990s comes from stabilization of the minimum wage and unions. Over
the late 1990s, the real value of the minimum wage stabilized, declining by
about 2%. The unionization rates also stabilized, and inequality in wages
for both the union and the nonunion workers decreased.
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Table 1 
Log real hourly wage (in Pesos) – measures of inequality 
 1984 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Std. Dev 0.748 0.787 0.800 0.843 0.821 0.839 0.815 
Gini 0.110 0.115 0.119 0.124 0.136 0.134 0.126 
90-10a 1.803 1.823 1.832 2.079 1.846 2.053 2.021 
90-50 0.905 0.993 1.022 1.386 1.153 1.226 1.145 
50-10 0.899 0.829 0.811 0.693 0.693 0.827 0.875 
Data source: Authors calculations from ENIGH.  Sample is full time, wage earners, men only (for 
details on data selection refer to main text, section 2.1).  Sample weights have been used for all the 
calculations. 
a This refers to the wage differential between the 90th and the 10th percentile.  90-50 and 50-10 are 
similarly defined. 
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Table 2 
Correlation between wage inequality and the reform indices 
  
Structural 
reform index 
Trade 
reforms 
Financial 
reforms 
Tax 
Policy Privatisation
Labour 
legislation 
Capital account 
liberalisation 
Std. Dev. 
 
0.895** -0.41 0.889** 0.339 0.637 -0.961* 0.955 
Gini 
 
0.597 -0.830*** 0.68 -0.174 0.782 -0.547 0.998** 
Structural 
reform index 
  0.670* 0.927* 0.788* 0.926* -0.932* 0.962* 
Trade reforms     0.433 0.738* 0.470*** -0.577** 0.833* 
Financial 
reforms 
 
      0.565** 0.835* -0.873* 0.879* 
Tax Policy 
 
        0.690* -0.817* 0.850* 
Privatisation           -0.856* 0.893* 
Labour 
legislation 
            -0.940* 
The reform indices (with the exception of capital account liberalization) are from Lora (2001).  Capital 
account liberalization reform index is from Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999).  Standard deviation 
and Gini coefficient of log real hourly wages are from authors’ calculations from the ENIGH data. 
* indicates significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and *** indicates significance at 10% 
level. 
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Table 3 
Characteristics of workers by sector 
 % Employed in each sector Mean log hourly real wage Mean years of schooling Unionisation rate 
 Tradable Nontradable    Tradable Nontradable Tradable Nontradable Tradable Nontradable
  FDI No FDI  FDI No FDI  FDI No FDI  FDI No FDI 
1984 23.76       38.45 37.80 3.887
(0.673) 
 
3.917 
(0.683)
3.476 
(0.780) 
7.148 
(3.768) 
8.242 
(4.187)
4.932 
(3.862) 
30.29 23.41 17.10
1989 21.31       
       
       
       
       
       
39.91 38.78 3.874
(0.731) 
 
3.887 
(0.749)
3.486 
(0.794) 
8.195 
(3.770)) 
8.747 
(4.319)
5.400 
(3.907) 
24.91 22.52 14.58
1992 24.97 41.77 33.26 3.883
(0.726) 
 
3.936 
(0.801)
3.507 
(0.784) 
7.830 
(3.784) 
8.828 
(4.113)
5.683 
(3.814) 
30.04 20.04 10.63
1994 23.02 41.3 35.69 3.863
(0.727) 
 
4.057 
(0.893)
3.579 
(0.777) 
7.820 
(3.646)) 
9.152 
(4.427)
5.706 
(3.959)) 
20.57 18.32 8.70
1996 24.95 43.83 31.22 3.550
(0.764) 
 
3.622 
(0.827)
3.180 
(0.784) 
8.359 
(3.646) 
9.300 
(4.197)
8.048 
(4.231) 
19.27 17.04 8.05
1998 22.78 45.68 31.54 3.617
(0.743) 
 
3.650 
(0.874)
3.503 
(0.839) 
8.258 
(3.703) 
9.293 
(4.079)
5.931 
(3.849) 
19.6 16.62 7.57
2000 24.61 42.20 33.19 3.814
(0.759) 
 
3.866 
(0.815)
3.348 
(0.751) 
8.771 
(3.316) 
10.088 
(4.260)
5.955 
(3.885) 
19.96 16.58 5.71
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ENIGH data.  Tradable sector is defined as the manufacturing industries (including maquiladores), these are assumed to be open to 
both trade and FDI.  Nontradable sectors are those industries, not open to traded activities.  Nontradable not open to FDI would include mineral and fuel extraction, electricity 
and water, construction, and transport and communication.  Nontradable open to FDI would include wholesale and retail trade, and service industries.  Standard deviations are 
given in the ( ) brackets. 
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Table 4 
Wage Regressions, Dependent Variable: Log real hourly wagea
Independent Variables 1984 1989 1996 2000 
Age 0.072* 0.061* 0.061* 0.045* 
Age Square -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 0.000* 
Union 0.228* 0.034*** 0.164* 0.148* 
Rcentre 0.122* 0.142* 0.199* 0.275* 
Rnorth 0.155* 0.204* 0.291* 0.386* 
Rcap 0.227* 0.135* 0.341* 0.369* 
Primary incomplete 0.237* 0.209* 0.124* 0.130* 
Primary complete 0.476* 0.297* 0.262* 0.221* 
Junior high incomplete 0.489* 0.363* 0.364* 0.200* 
Junior high complete 0.445* 0.456* 0.434* 0.253* 
High school incomplete 0.571* 0.680* 0.624* 0.424* 
High school complete 0.793* 0.738* 0.712* 0.496* 
Some college 0.624* 0.772* 0.955* 0.108 
College complete 0.821* 1.243* 1.228* 0.820* 
More than college 1.317* 1.547* 0.846** 1.181* 
Tradable (T) 0.153 0.008 0.076 -0.172 
Nontradable  with FDI (NTF) 0.044 0.253* 0.121*** -0.081 
Primary incomplete*T -0.155 -0.036 -0.012 0.107 
Primary complete*T -0.139 0.011 -0.017 0.137 
Junior high incomplete*T -0.136 0.083 -0.115 0.009 
Junior high complete*T -0.050 -0.081 -0.060 0.162 
High school incomplete*T 0.029 -0.206 -0.188 0.076 
High school complete*T -0.078 0.041 -0.258** 0.156 
Some college*T -0.014 0.017 -0.026 1.064* 
College complete*T -0.179 -0.002 0.085 0.624* 
More than college*T 0.135 Droppedb 0.597 0.130 
Primary incomplete*NTF -0.020 -0.263* -0.119 -0.159*** 
Primary complete*NTF -0.167 -0.297* -0.077 -0.047 
Junior high incomplete*NTF -0.051 -0.240* -0.106 -0.087 
Junior high complete*NTF 0.060 -0.306* -0.150** 0.046 
High school incomplete*NTF -0.135 -0.441* -0.216** -0.091* 
High school complete*NTF -0.234 -0.333* -0.172** -0.142 
Some college*NTF 0.050 -0.262* -0.221** 0.446 
College complete*NTF 0.040 -0.548* -0.405* 0.083 
More than college*NTF -0.011 -0.517* 0.370 0.160 
Occupation Dummies Jointly significant in all regressions 
Constant 2.164* 2.212* 1.869* 2.637* 
     
N (sample size) 2586 7225 8106 5881 
R2 0.531 0.428 0.539 0.588 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ENIGH data. 
a The regression is weighted by the sample weights.  * indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 10% levels. 
b No observations for this category. 
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Table 5 
Characteristics of workers by union membership 
 Union Density 
(%) 
Mean log hourly real wage Std. Dev. of log hourly 
real wage 
  Union Nonunion Union Nonunion 
1984 22.66 4.418 3.625 0.508 0.766 
1989 19.95 3.967 3.669 0.662 0.805 
1992 19.41 4.091 3.705 0.679 0.810 
1994 15.41 4.179 3.780 0.656 0.858 
1996 14.79 3.909 3.389 0.666 0.822 
1998 14.44 4.032 3.413 0.708 0.827 
2000 13.81 4.138 3.608 0.815 0.653 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ENIGH data. 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Contribution of each explanatory variable to the level of, and change in wage inequality  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Relative factor inequality 
weight,  js
Contribution of the factor to 
change in inequality, jπ  
 1984 1989 1996 1984-1989 1989-1996 
Age 0.116 0.083 0.088 -0.218 0.145 
Union 0.037 0.003 0.016 -0.322 0.182 
Region 0.018 0.011 0.029 -0.056 0.249 
Industry 0.014 0.026 0.015 0.135 -0.129 
Education 0.143 0.192 0.223 0.648 0.605 
Education*Industry -0.007 -0.050 -0.030 -0.447 0.212 
Occupation 0.209 0.162 0.199 -0.271 0.655 
Residual 0.469 0.572 0.461 1.530 -0.918 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the ENIGH data.   is calculated based on equation (2) in the 
paper;  
js
jπ  is calculated based on equation (4) in the paper.  For definitions of the explanatory 
variables  refer to Table A2, Appendix A. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 
Indicators of Trade Reforms, Liberalization and Macroeconomic Performance in Mexico 
Year Domestic Product
covered by Import 
Licenses
 Import Licenses: 
Controlled Items 
(% of Imports)1 2
Real Exchange 
Rate Annual 
Change % (Base 
1980)3
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(Billions of US 
Dollars)4
Gross Domestic 
Product (Real 
Annual Growth 
Rate %)5
Real Minimum 
Wage (1985=100)6
1984       4.16 3.6
1985 92.2%      0.62 2.5 100
1986 46.9%      -27.26 2.4 -3.7 92.6
1987 35.8%      -6.37 2.6 1.9 86.1
1988 23.2%      22.65 2.9 1.2 75.2
1989 22.1%      18.4 13.3 3.2 3.3 70.3
1990 19.0%      13.6 5.07 2.6 4.5 63.8
1991       8.9 9.78 4.8 4.2 61
1992       10.5 15.92 4.4 3.6 58.2
1993       21.6 7.52 4.4 2.0 57.3
1994       10.6 -3.36 11.0 4.5 57.3
1995       7.2 -39.72 9.5 -6.2 50.2
1996       6.8 -3.19 9.2 5.2 46
1997       8.2 12.18 12.8 6.7 45.6
1998       8.5 -1.20/p 11.3 4.8 45.8
1999       1.46 11.6/p 3.7 45.3
                                                 
1 Average share of output in manufacturing subject to import licensing, as a percentage of total domestic manufacturing output.  Source: Lustig, 2001. 
2 Controlled items, in the imports subject to licences, weighted by value of imports.  Source: Table 49, The Mexican Economy 1997 and 1999, Banco de Mexico. 
3 Source: Table 32, The Mexican Economy 1999, Banco de Mexico.  Negative change indicates depreciation. 
4 Source: Table 50, The Mexican Economy 1996, Banco de Mexico and Table 56, The Mexican Economy 1999, Banco de Mexico. 
5 Source: Table 7, The Mexican Economy 1996 and 1999, Banco de Mexico 
6 Source: Table 20, The Mexican Economy 1996 and 1999, Banco de Mexico. 
p: preliminary figures 
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Table A2 
Definition of Education, Regional Occupational and Industrial dummies 
Variable Definition 
Education Dummies* (years of schooling) 
No formal education (this is the base and has 0 years of schooling) 
Primary incomplete (3) 
Primary complete (6) 
Junior high incomplete (7.5) 
Junior high complete (9) 
High school incomplete (10.5) 
High school complete (12) 
Some college (14) 
College complete (16) 
More than college (We assume that 2 years for everyone who reports more than college) 
Regional Dummies 
Base Southern states: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, 
Veracruz, Yucatan 
Rcentre Central states: Aquascalientes, Colima, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Mexico, 
Michoacan, Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, Tlaxcala 
Rnorth Northern states: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Coahuila, 
Durango, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, 
Zacatecas 
Rcap Federal District 
Industrial Dummies 
Nontradable, 
No FDI 
(Base category) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishery etc.; Mineral and fuel 
extraction, electricity and water; construction; and transport and communication. 
Nontradable, 
FDI 
Wholesale and retail trade, and service industries. 
Tradable Manufacturing industries (including maquiladores) 
Occupational Dummies 
Base Professionals 
Occ1 Technicians 
Occ2 Educational workers 
Occ3 Workers in arts, entertainment and sports 
Occ4 Senior directors, administrators in public and private enterprises 
Occ6 Agricultural workers 
Occ10 Supervisors – industrial production 
Occ11 Workers, operators – industrial production 
Occ12 Less-skilled workers – industrial production 
Occ13 Administrative workers – industrial production 
Occ14 Salespersons 
Occ15 Vendors, peddlers – with no business representation 
Occ16 Personal service workers – Establishments 
Occ17 Personal service workers – Domestic 
Occ18 Transport workers 
Occ19 Police and armed forces 
 
                                                 
* For the  years before 1996 ENIGH reports whether or not an individual completed a certain level of 
schooling, not the actual years spent in any particular level of schooling.  For the completed levels of 
schooling we take the years that would take to complete the level without repetition.  For the 
incomplete levels of schooling it is assumed that the individual attended half of the school cycle.  These 
are the standard assumptions made in the literature, in the absence of data on actual years of schooling 
(Binder and Woodruff, 2002), however they do have limitations (Behram and Deolalikar, 1991).  From 
1996 onwards ENIGH started reporting the actual years in school for those with less than 12 years of 
schooling.  We compare our approximation for 1996, 1998 and 2000 with the actual years; results are 
similar.  To keep consistency with earlier years we use the approximation for later years as well. 
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Figure 1. Change in log real hourly wages by percentile
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Source: Authors calculations from the ENIGH data. 
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Figure 2. Reform Indices
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Structural reform index is average of trade reforms, financial reforms, tax policy, privatization and labour legislation.  Source: Capital account liberalization index is from 
Morley et al (1999); the other indices are from Lora (2001). 
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 Figure 3. Trade reform index, Imports and Real exchange rate
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Source: Trade reform index is from Lora (2001); Real exchange rate is from The Mexican Economy 
1999, Banco de Mexico; figures for imports are from Secretaria de Economia. 
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